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ABSTRACT 
 
This study was carried out to consider the effectiveness of energy sector governance and electricity 
pricing in Nigeria – which also has implications for West Africa’s power pool and energy policies 
in the region. This paper applies the concept of cost reflectivity to analyze the current electricity 
tariff regime in Nigeria. Multi Year Tariff Order (MYTO) 2015 methodology was applied in the 
analysis - employing the marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenue concepts (MR). It was noticed 
that, the cost of providing a unit of electricity (1 kWh) varies by region while the revenue generated 
from providing the same unit of electricity also varies by region. However, energy sector 
governance in the main West African electricity market - Nigeria - is very weak. While, a 
competitive market structure is gradually emerging, debts accrue along the value chain with every 
unit of power consumed. More so, the underlying assumptions of the methodology have been 
consistently violated and as such tariffs have not been completely cost-reflective. Some underlying 
assumptions of the MYTO methodology need to be reviewed for it to sufficiently de-risk energy 
investments in Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) especially against macroeconomic 
shocks.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
MYTO:  Multi-Year Tariff Order 
NERC:  Nigerian Electricity Regulation Commission 
NEPA:  National Electric Power Authority  
PHCN:  Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
GWH:  Gigawatt-Hour 
KwH:  Kilowatt-Hour 
GDP:  Gross Domestic Product  
TCN:  Transmission Company of Nigeria 
NESI:  Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry 
DisCos:  Electricity Distribution Companies 
GenCos: Electricity Generation Companies 
CAPEX: Capital Expenditure 
OPEX:  Operating Expenditure 
WACC:  Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
MC:  Marginal Cost 
MR:  Marginal Revenue 
MYTO-1 or MYTO (1.0):  Multi-Year Tariff Order 2008 to 2021 
MYTO-2 or MYTO (2.0):  Multi-Year Tariff Order 2012 to 2017 
MYTO-2.1:     Multi-Year Tariff Order 2015 to 2018 
MYTO-2.1 (Amended) or MYTO 2015:  Multi-Year Tariff Order 2015 to 2024 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Energy plays a fundamental part in the economic growth process. More than three-quarters of the 
studies reviewed find a positive correlation between energy use and economic growth, and half the 
studies find a positive and significant causal link from energy use to economic growth. Energy use 
is either the cause or the facilitator of economic growth (The CDC Group Plc, 2016). To achieve 
economic growth and consequently, development, it is therefore of utmost importance for 
developing economies to stimulate growth in energy provision. In view of the structural problems 
facing Nigeria and other developing nations, an influx of private and public investments will be 
instrumental in increasing her productive capacity. 
 
Though often overlooked, energy industry governance is crucial to the realization of policy goals. 
Sustainable economic development is unachievable without clear rules and effective governance 
of energy industries. Due to policy incoherence, governance issues and misalignment of electricity 
markets are some of the key factors hindering renewable energy innovation in many countries 
(Ang, Röttgers, & Burli, 2017). The case of electricity tariff risks associated with potential 
investments in Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) demonstrates the need for better 
governance. Furthermore, for investors to be convinced that NESI is profitable for investments, the 
issue of the cost-reflectivity in the tariff system needs to be considered. This is particularly relevant 
for electricity supplies into the West African Power Pool (WAPP). More so, with the Nigerian Bulk 
Electricity Trading Plc (NBET) managing the long-term relationship between Nigeria and Niger’s 
NIGELEC, as well as, Benin Republic’s SAKETE. According to Shaw, Attree, and Jackson (2008), 
cost reflectivity is a requirement that prices and charges signal the cost of an activity. Cost 
reflectivity implies that prices depend on factors such as location, time, pattern of use and other 
users. Cost reflective pricing results in allocative efficiency and a customer’s response depends on 
how much the service is valued. The maximization of society’s benefit resulting from cost 
reflectivity makes pricing efficient (CUAC, 2015). The following discourse gives a context to the 
underlying issues.  
 
Electric power generation in Nigeria began in 1896. In 1972, NEPA was formed, which later 
metamorphosed to Power Holding Company of Nigeria - as a holding company created for the 
unbundling and subsequent privatization of the government ownership. The GDP of Nigeria’s 
power sector in 2015 was estimated at ₦536,673,000,000 (NBS, 2016) with 25 power plants in the 
country. According to the World Bank, Nigeria is second to India on the list of countries with the 
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highest electricity access deficit with 75 million people compared to India’s 263 million persons 
(Muanya, 2017). 
 
The methodology for setting electricity prices in Nigeria has been vague and uncertain since the 
Nigerian electricity sector was established. One reason is that electricity was considered a public 
welfare service to be provided by the government. Therefore, the electricity price had traditionally 
been subsidized. Prior to 2008, a uniform pricing structure was used in which the electricity tariff 
remained fixed for years despite continuous rise in the price of generation fuels. Consequently, the 
company operated with monthly deficits of nearly ₦2 billion and this resulted in unreliable and 
inadequate electricity supply. This pricing regime discouraged the entry of profit oriented private 
investors (the existing law or absence of enabling legislation was a greater deterrent to private 
investment than the tariffs). There was a need for appropriate policies to institute transparency in 
tariff determination and provide stability and predictability in electricity pricing (Bello, 2013).  
 
Owing to this, Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was established to develop a 
new tariff regime towards reforming energy markets. One of the primary functions of NERC is to 
ensure that prices charged by licensees are fair to consumers and sufficient to allow the licensees 
to finance their activities and to allow for reasonable earnings for efficient operation. NERC is 
empowered to establish one or more tariff methodologies for regulating electricity prices to prevent 
abuse of market power. In its effort to provide a viable and robust tariff policy for NESI, NERC in 
2008 introduced a Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) as the framework for determining the 
industry’s pricing structure. The MYTO methodology provides the process to tariff regulation - in 
compliance with the statutory obligation in Section 76 of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 
(EPSRA) 2005 (FGN, 2005). It provided a fifteen-year tariff path for the electricity industry with 
minor and major reviews bi-annually and every five years respectively (NERC, 2012) 
 
The first MYTO model was introduced in 2008, reviewed over the years and several alterations 
have been made to it. Initially, the model termed MYTO 1.0 was applied from 2008 to 2012. 
Subsequently, following a major review of the methodology in June 2012, MYTO 2.0 was issued 
and it was to remain effective from 2012 to 2017 (Adeyeye, 2017). However, after a minor review 
in December 2014, NERC issued a new MYTO called the MYTO 2.1 that was to take effect from 
January 2015 to 2018. That was not to be because in April 2015, NERC, revised and amended 
MYTO 2.1 by removing the collection loss component of the electricity tariffs resulting in MYTO 
2.1 (amended). Subsequent review of the amended model brought about the issuance of MYTO 
2015 which is expected to remain effective from 2015 to 2024. MYTO 2015 methodology provides 
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for a 10-year tariff scheme that ensures all stakeholders make necessary investments and recover 
profit between 2016 – 2024 (Adeyeye, 2017).  
 
1.2 Statement of The Problem 
Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) operations report indicates that over N534 billion of 
revenue was lost by the power sector in 2016. Among the reasons for the loss were shortages in 
gas supply, frequency and line limitations, as well as, water levels management constraints that led 
to several cases of electricity outage in the country. According to Ahiuma-Young, Obasi & Ejoh 
(2017) part of the N534 billion lost could have been used to bridge the liquidity gap in the power 
sector, estimated at N1trillion.  
 
Despite the above, the greatest risk faced by investors across the entire electricity value chain in a 
privatized power sector is payment risk – which is particularly high in Nigeria’s power sector. 
Distribution companies (DisCos) - primary revenue source of the entire power sector value chain - 
have been unable to meet their energy payments in full and other obligations to the electricity 
market. Thus, Generation companies (GenCos), gas producers and gas suppliers are owed billions 
of naira in outstanding payments for power generated and sold to DisCos (Omonfoman, 2016). The 
consequences of poor governance and under-utilized or under-performing power sector are: 
poverty, inequality, and high operating costs, as well as, difficulty of doing business. The afore-
mentioned issues hamper economic growth and sustainable development of any developing 
economy. 
 
The impact of electricity generation or consumption on economic growth has been thoroughly 
analyzed and studied in different countries - developed and developing, including Nigeria. 
However, the pricing models or methodology behind electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution in such countries have received little attention. Ahmed (2013), assessed the impact of 
MYTO on the flow of private investment to the Nigerian electricity supply industry (NESI). The 
study indicates that tariff review has a positive and significant impact on the flow of private 
investment to NESI though it explains only about 3% of the variation in the dependent variable 
(FPI).  
 
Have the Multi Year Tariff Orders (MYTO) been reviewed continually because the pricing 
methodology is weak or they are not cost-reflective? Could it be due to poor governance in the 
energy sector or a combination of both. This study aims to answer these questions, provide 
empirical evidence on whether Nigeria’s MYTO system is cost-reflective and, if yes, to what extent 
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is it? Some studies have focused on Nigeria’s MYTO regime but very little empirical research has 
been done on it. Moreover, very few studies have emphasized the governance aspect of energy 
sector pricing considered here and so this study aims to fill these knowledge gaps.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study, Research Questions and Scope 
The general objective of this study to find out if the prices determined by using the Multi-Year 
Tariff Order (MYTO) methodology reflect the costs of electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution. It measures the unit cost of energy provision relative to the revenue per unit to 
determine net profit or loss accruing along the value chain. Specifically, the study addresses the 
following questions: Is the revenue from one unit of electricity provided greater than the cost of 
producing that unit? If not, how has energy sector governance failed to bring about cost reflective 
pricing in NESI?  
 
The study covers the period from 2015 to 2017 and focuses solely on the MYTO (2015) 
methodology and the power sector of the Nigerian economy. The limitations of this study include 
the confidentiality of the model and reliability of the secondary data used. However, the analysis 
is conceptually sound and discussions significantly contribute to existing literature. Furthermore, 
it highlights key issues for future research endeavours. 
 
2.1 Conceptual Review of Literature 
Power flows from generation to transmission and then to distribution where it is sold to consumers. 
Generation involves conversion into electricity from energy resources like fossil fuels, uranium, wind, 
biomass, hydro, geothermal and solar. It includes electricity produced in electricity-only plants and in 
combined heat and power plants (OECD, 2016). After electricity is generated at a power plant (by a 
generating company/project), it is transmitted on high-voltage power lines before it can be 
distributed to homes and businesses. Electric power transmission involves transferring electricity 
from power plants to local distribution grids. Subsequently, it is distributed to end-users on local 
power distribution lines. Electricity distribution is the final stage in electricity delivery and it is the 
most familiar portion of the supply chain as power lines carry electricity into homes and businesses 
(IER, 2014).  
 
Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) is made up of seven (7) generating stations, one (1) 
transmission system and eleven (11) distribution/marketing zones which are captured in Figure 1. 
Distribution companies (DisCos) generally serve as financial conduits within the industry: 
receiving and distributing electricity to end-users; billing customers; providing payment services 
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for collecting and remitting revenues (after deducting its overhead costs) to the Nigerian Bulk 
Electricity Trading Plc (NBET). 
 
Electricity trading and functioning of the market is hinged on funds flowing backward from 
consumers through the distribution outlets to the rest of the electricity value chain. Though, a key 
objective for the sector reform was to ensure liquidity in the electricity value chain, but it is 
currently not happening (Ogbu, 2016). More so, the inadequate provision of pre-paid meters for 
many consumers hampers revenue collection and realization of return on investment. This situation 
is further complicated by power theft and several illegal connections that are not accounted for 
within the MYTO regime (Adeyeye, 2017). In the prevailing circumstance, it is apparent that 
energy sector governance should be re-evaluated to de-risk investments and ensure the emergence 
of sustainable electricity trading. 
 
Figure 1: Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry 
 
Source: Sahara Group (2017) 
 
Under MYTO-2, there were two (2) major changes to the existing methodology and these were 
brought about by the need to: 
✓ be more flexible in wholesale power generation pricing 
✓ consider several other variables during minor reviews 
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This major review afforded stakeholders the opportunity to evaluate the methodology, make inputs 
into the existing model, incorporate Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) for renewable energy (wind, biomass, 
solar and small hydro) and develop tariffs for coal-fired power generators. Some of the assumptions 
reviewed included: available generation capacity, forecast of electricity demand, expansion of the 
transmission and distribution networks, capital expenditure (capex), actual and projected sales, 
operating costs (opex), fuel costs, interest rates, weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and 
revenue collection efficiencies and subsidies. 
 
NERC (2012) used the building blocks approach as a regulatory method to set Distribution Use of 
System (DUOS) charges. The building blocks approach is simply a way of bringing together all 
costs identifiable in the industry in a consistent accounting framework. In the approach, NESI’s 
overall revenue requirements were computed and used as the basis for calculation of the revenue 
to be collected per unit of electricity sold. The annual revenue requirements for distribution and 
retailing determined, using the building block approach, was then divided by the forecasted level 
of energy delivered to each of the existing eleven (11) distribution networks to produce a DUOS 
charge per unit of electricity to be sold and collected by the relevant Disco.  
 
Cost reflective pricing is when the price of a good or service reflects its cost of production. It has 
several benefits, for example: where a consumer values a good/service more than its cost of 
production, the consumer will purchase the good/service. This results in net benefit to society 
because the cost of inputs is less than the benefits gained (by the consumer). Where a consumer 
does not value a good/service more than its cost of production, the consumer will not purchase the 
good/service. This prevents a net loss to society. By sending signals about production costs, cost 
reflective pricing allows consumers’ and producers’ resources to be allocated to activities that have 
the greatest net benefit to society. This maximisation of welfare makes pricing efficient (Jones, 
2015). 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Marginal cost pricing and average cost pricing are two basic concepts of energy pricing that are 
widely used (Bhattacharyya, 2011). Although long-run average cost is sometimes a proxy for 
marginal cost both concepts are fundamental to determining the most profitable level of output 
from a given plant. Marginal variable cost, or simply marginal cost MC(y) is the increase in variable 
cost incurred when output (y) is increased by one unit:  
MC(y) = VC (y + 1) – VC (y)    (3.0) 
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Theoretically, a more precise definition can be obtained by regarding VC(y) as a continuous 
function of output (Dorfman, 2006). Given certain economic disadvantages of average cost 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011), the marginal cost concept is applied here. The short-run marginal cost 
concept assumes that at least one factor of production is fixed. This offers a simplistic and easy to 
understand analysis. More so, it can be used very conveniently to ascertain the cost-effectiveness 
of the pricing methodology in the power sector. If the marginal cost of any given output (y) is less 
than the price, sales revenues will increase more than cost as output is increased by one unit (or 
even a few units); and profits will rise. Conversely, if the marginal cost is greater than the price, 
profits will be increased by cutting back output by at least one unit. It then follows that the output 
that maximizes profits is the one for which MC(y) = P0. In the short-run, at a given price, the profit-
maximizing firm will produce and offer the quantity for which the marginal cost equals that price 
(Dorfman, 2006).  
 
The conclusion that marginal cost tends to equal price is important in that it shows how the quantity 
of output produced by a firm is influenced by the market price in a competitive market. Thus, the 
quantity that the firm will produce in response to any price can be found by plotting the marginal 
cost curve, and for this reason the marginal cost curve is said to be the short-run supply curve for 
the firm (Dorfman, 2006) 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
The model to be used in this study is specified below: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸  𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑂𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅𝐸 − 𝑇𝐶𝐸                                                                  (3.1) 
Where: 𝑃𝑅𝐸  𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑂𝐸 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
             𝑇𝑅𝐸 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
             𝑇𝐶𝐸 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Rewriting equation (3.1) above using the marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenue (MR) concepts and 
inputting them in the short-run profit-maximization function: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸 = 𝑀𝐶𝐸 < 𝑀𝑅𝐸                                                                             (3.2) 
𝐿𝑂𝐸 = 𝑀𝐶𝐸 > 𝑀𝑅𝐸                                                                             (3.3) 
                                                      𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒: 𝑀𝑅𝐸 = 𝑝𝑒 
Where: 𝑃𝑅𝐸  𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑂𝐸 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
            𝑀𝐶𝐸 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1 𝑘𝑊ℎ) 
            𝑀𝑅𝐸 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1 𝑘𝑊ℎ) 
            𝑝𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 1 𝑘𝑊ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
4.1 Data Analysis and Discussion  
To answer the research questions, descriptive statistical technique is applied to historical data 
sourced from the regulator (NERC). This approach is considered suitable using actual costs of 
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electricity supplied and revenue data from the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) – hence, 
no need to estimate parameters and test the hypothesis using inferential statistical techniques. The 
unit cost of electricity provision is the marginal cost of providing 1kWh of electricity to the end 
users and in the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry, it varies from one region to the other – and 
for the respective DisCos. From Table 4.1, the unit costs of generation, transmission and 
distribution add up to the unit cost of 1kWh of electricity supplied.  
 
Table 4.1 Unit Cost of Energy Supplied 
DisCos Generation Cost (₦/kWh) 
Transmission Cost 
(₦/kWh) Distribution Cost (₦/kWh) 
Unit Cost of 1kWh 
(₦/kWh) 
  2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 
Abuja 9.82 13.26 13.09 2.64 3.38 3.61 23.63 17.06 12.07 36.08 33.70 28.77 
Benin 8.49 13.26 13.09 2.28 3.38 3.61 29.42 21.88 15.53 40.19 38.52 32.24 
Enugu 10.44 13.26 13.09 2.81 3.38 3.61 19.03 22.14 14.80 32.28 38.78 31.51 
Ibadan 8.75 13.26 13.09 2.36 3.38 3.61 23.18 17.97 13.45 34.29 34.61 30.16 
Jos 7.26 13.26 13.09 1.96 3.38 3.61 42.17 30.29 24.01 51.40 46.93 40.72 
Kaduna 7.82 13.26 13.09 2.11 3.38 3.61 33.35 18.71 11.65 43.29 35.35 28.35 
Kano 5.01 13.26 13.09 1.35 3.38 3.61 38.68 19.63 13.54 45.04 36.27 30.24 
Eko 7.62 13.26 13.09 2.06 3.38 3.61 19.02 11.26 8.33 28.70 27.90 25.03 
Ikeja 8.06 13.26 13.09 2.18 3.38 3.61 16.37 10.54 7.75 26.61 27.18 24.45 
P/H 9.28 13.26 13.09 2.50 3.38 3.61 32.61 27.06 19.21 44.39 43.70 35.92 
Yola 3.77 13.26 13.09 1.02 3.38 3.61 55.62 19.36 14.75 60.41 36.00 31.45 
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC and MYTO (2015) Methodology 
Along the value chain of Nigeria’s Electricity Supply Industry, distribution appears to be the 
costliest. In this regard, distribution losses are due to poorly located and/or non-metered buildings 
nationwide - as presented in Table 4.2. Furthermore, it is notable that about 50% of the 6.85 million 
customers in the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry are not metered.  
 
Table 4.2 Customer Base and Distribution Metering Gap as at January 2017  
DisCos Number of Customers Total Metered Metering Gap 
Abuja 862,696 452,897 409,799 
Benin 771,226 576,330 194,896 
Eko 407,285 238,042 169,243 
Enugu 809,829 222,184 587,645 
Ibadan 1,375,811 621,187 754,624 
Ikeja 755,525 479,862 275,663 
Jos 329,858 175,517 154,341 
Kaduna 405,951 225,695 180,256 
Kano 472,453 150,322 322,131 
PH 368,311 267,092 101,219 
Yola 293,478 69,209 224,269 
Total 6,852,423 3,478,337 3,374,086 
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC  
 
Non-metering along the value chain (grid level, intra-transmission and distribution) is a result of 
poor governance which has further implications. Some effects of non-metering by DisCos are: 
a) lack of accurate customer/consumption information, free electricity consumption by 
unknown/undocumented consumers and unquantified losses  
b) poor management of distribution system and inefficient/costly service delivery   
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c) low revenue collections and unmet revenue projections by DisCos 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC and MYTO (2015) Methodology 
 
Furthermore, due to distribution losses, costs incurred by DisCos are very high – understandably, 
the highest component of electricity supply cost in NESI. For instance, within the jurisdiction of 
Yola Distribution Company (DisCo) only 23.58% of customers have meters – the lowest 
percentage in the entire country.  
  
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC and MYTO (2015) Methodology  
 
As such, the unit cost of electricity distribution by Yola DisCo is among the highest. Although, the 
cost of generating and transmitting 1 kWh to Yola DisCo is among the lowest, it has one of the 
highest overall cost of providing 1 kWh. Meanwhile, Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that Ikeja DisCo 
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00
Abuja
Benin
Enugu
Ibadan
Jos
Kaduna
Kano
Eko
Ikeja
P/H
Yola
Figure 2: Per Unit Cost of Electricity Distribution (₦/kWh)
2017 2016 2015
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00
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Ikeja
P/H
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Figure 3: Unit Cost of Electricity Provision (₦/kWh)
2017 2016 2015
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has the lowest cost of electricity provision due to lower distribution losses incurred, economies of 
scale and possibly cost savings.  
 
Table 4.3 The Revenue Per Unit of Energy Provided 
Average Tariff (₦/kWh) 
DisCos 2015 2016 2017 
Abuja 36.08 33.70 28.77 
Benin 40.19 38.52 32.24 
Enugu 32.28 38.78 31.51 
Ibadan 34.29 34.61 30.16 
Jos 51.40 46.93 40.72 
Kaduna 43.29 35.35 28.35 
Kano 45.04 36.27 30.24 
Eko 28.70 27.90 25.03 
Ikeja 26.61 27.18 24.45 
P/H 44.39 43.70 35.92 
Yola 60.41 36.00 31.45 
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC 
 
To maximize profits, in the short-run – where at least one factor of production is fixed – it is 
necessary for each firm’s marginal revenue – market price – to be at the same level as the marginal 
cost. In a nutshell, to maximize profits in the short-run, firms will aim to supply energy at the point 
where their marginal cost (of generation/distribution) equals their marginal revenue. Table 4.3 
shows that this varies for DisCos across the country. It is notable from the Table 4.3 that the average 
tariff paid by all five (5) classes of consumers in the power sector decreases over time. The revenue 
gotten from one unit of electricity provided is the marginal revenue generated by providing 1kWh 
of electricity for end users in NESI and it varies from one region to the other. 
4.4 Unit Cost (computed) and Average Tariff of Electricity  
 2015 2016 2017 
 DisCo 
Average 
Tariff 
(₦/kWh) 
Unit Cost 
of 1kWh 
(₦/kWh) 
Average 
Tariff 
(₦/kWh) 
Unit Cost 
of 1kWh 
(₦/kWh) 
Average 
Tariff 
(₦/kWh) 
Unit Cost 
of 1kWh 
(₦/kWh) 
Abuja 36.08 36.08 33.70 33.70 28.77 28.77 
Benin 40.19 40.19 38.52 38.52 32.24 32.24 
Enugu 32.28 32.28 38.78 38.78 31.51 31.51 
Ibadan 34.29 34.29 34.61 34.61 30.16 30.16 
Jos 51.40 51.40 46.93 46.93 40.72 40.72 
Kaduna 43.29 43.29 35.35 35.35 28.35 28.35 
Kano 45.04 45.04 36.27 36.27 30.24 30.24 
Eko 28.70 28.70 27.90 27.90 25.03 25.03 
Ikeja 26.61 26.61 27.18 27.18 24.45 24.45 
P/H 44.39 44.39 43.70 43.70 35.92 35.92 
Yola 60.41 60.41 36.00 36.00 31.45 31.45 
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC and MYTO (2015) Methodology 
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Applying MYTO (2015) methodology sets the price of one unit of electricity provided equal to the 
cost for each regional market in Nigeria – as may be seen in Table 4.4 and Figure 4. 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation using data from NERC and MYTO (2015) Methodology 
 
Furthermore, the cost of providing one unit of electricity (MC) and corresponding price (MR) are 
projected to decrease yearly. Considering that the computed results, we can say that the MYTO 
methodology sets prices that are cost-reflective if every cost is passed on the consumer. However, 
the assumptions underlying multi-year tariff calculations are no longer tenable but have changed 
drastically as summarized in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5  Some changing Parameters/Assumptions of MYTO Methodology 
 
Source: Dr. Anthony Akah “NERC’s Perspective on Liquidity Challenge in the Power Sector & the Disco” (2017) 
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Figure 4: Marginal Cost & Revenue of Electricity Provision
2015 Averge Tariff (₦/kWh) 2015 Unit Cost of 1kWh (₦/kWh)
2016 Averge Tariff (₦/kWh) 2016 Unit Cost of 1kWh (₦/kWh)
2017 Averge Tariff (₦/kWh) 2017 Unit Cost of 1kWh (₦/kWh)
Parameters 
 MYTO Tariff 
Projections 
2016
Actuals as at 
30th September 
2016
Difference Remark
Nigerian 
Inflation 
8.80% 17.90% 103%
Exogenous variable 
negatively impacting on 
cost reflectivity of tariffs
Naira to U.S 
Dollar 
Exchange 
Rate 
198.97 308.56 55%
Exogenous variable 
negatively impacting on 
cost reflectivity of tariffs
U.S. Inflation 0.20% 1.50% 650%
Exogenous variable 
negatively impacting on 
cost reflectivity of tariffs
Generation 
Capacity MW 
5465 3213 -41%
Exogenous variable 
negatively impacting on 
cost reflectivity of tariffs
Energy 
Delivered to 
Discos GWh 
38639 22718 -41%
Exogenous variable 
negatively impacting on 
cost reflectivity of tariffs
Generation 
Cost N/kWh + 
TLF 
13.26 18.79 42%
Exogenous variable 
negatively impacting on 
cost reflectivity of tariffs
Assumptions
13 
 
Meanwhile, only changes in four (4) variables – inflation rate, gas prices, foreign exchange rates 
and daily generation capacity - call for minor review of the MYTO as stipulated by the NERC.  
Over the past two years, two of these variables - inflation rate and exchange rates - have been 
changing drastically. When the generation capacity (MW) and generation costs drastically change, 
a major review of the MYTO methodology is required. So far, MYTO methodology have become 
complex to govern in NESI. It has become more expensive to produce one unit of electricity but 
tariffs have not been raised to reflect the increased cost of generation, transmission and distribution. 
Another pertinent issue which is unclear but worth considering is the responsiveness of tariffs to 
unexpected declines in costs along the value chain. 
 
5.1 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
MYTO appears to be efficient and cost reflective as a methodology for energy price determination. 
Due to poor governance, its applicability in Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) throws up 
peculiar challenges regarding timeliness or rapidness of cost reflectivity due to the metering gaps 
identified. The analysis indicates that when assumptions and parameters of MYTO methodology – 
available generation capacity, electricity demand, expansion of the transmission and distribution 
networks, capital expenditure, actual and projected sales, operating costs, fuel costs, interest rates, 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC), revenue collection efficiencies, subsidies, gas prices 
and foreign exchange rates – are not violated, the set energy prices (tariffs) are cost-reflective. 
However, when the assumptions are violated, the MYTO methodology does not set prices that are 
cost-reflective but misleading. This is because the marginal cost of providing one unit of electricity 
becomes higher than the marginal revenue. Consequently, every unit of power consumed results in 
some debt owed DisCos, transmission company of Nigeria (TCN), and generating companies 
(GenCos) - debts accrue along the value chain. Herein, lies another failure of governance. 
 
Based on the findings of this study, the following are recommended: 
I. Dealing with unmetered customers and closing the metering gap is highly necessary to 
reduce the losses in revenue from these unmetered customers. Also, a framework to 
decouple Metering from DisCos to facilitate third-party investment in metering should also 
be implemented so that DisCos can focus on the key task of distributing electricity. This 
will increase the efficiency of demand-side management. DisCos should also be made to 
purchase locally manufactured meters instead of importing at higher costs.  
 
II. It is recommended that tariffs should be made 100% cost reflective with no provision for 
accommodating DisCos’ inability to raise funds from commercial banks to finance under-
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recoveries built into the tariffs. The level of tariff sculpting (if any), should be determined 
by each individual Disco, however, this will be dependent on DisCos signing up to activate 
their contracts, making full payment and bearing stiff sanctions in case of default. Also, 
reviewing meter pricing (in the tariff structure) that is still benchmarked to Naira-US Dollar 
exchange rate of N160. This is one of the reasons why there is a shortage of meters in the 
market. Furthermore, the DisCos need to be transparent with their financial records and be 
more accountable to enable the GenCos and the TCN collect the monies due them  
 
III. With regards to the available generation capacity, the implementation of feed-in-tariffs to 
attract and encourage private sector investment in clean coal-fired and solar-powered plants 
will increase energy available to send to the DisCos for distribution. The current level of 
interest rates (14%) discourages all investment borrowings locally by firms in the power 
sector, the commercial and development banks should give loans with single digit interest 
rates – from 0% to 9% - to these companies. Firms can then use these investments to expand 
and boost their available capacities. A reworking of the governance structure to reduce debt 
burden along the value chain will go a long way to make tariffs more cost reflective. 
 
IV. With regards to the expansion of distribution and transmission networks, key steps should 
to be taken for the development of a smarter grid that will boost the efficiency of energy 
provision.  
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